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Cusa is his sense of the radical contingency of all things 
other than God. The scientific question as to whether the 
universe is finite or infinite must be resolved by scientific 
investigation, not by theology or metaphysics. Whatever 
the answer to that question turns out to be, from the 
metaphysical standpoint the universe is finite, because it is 
not God. If we give up the reassurance of monism and 
acknowledge the incommensurability of the Creator with 
the created, we can truly give thanks for an existence that 
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“‘But Following the Literal Sense, the Jews Refuse 
to Understand’: Hermeneutic Conflicts in Nicholas 
of Cusa’s De pace fidei” by Jason Aleksander, Xavier University, Illinois 
Were I to confine my remarks under the title of this essay 
to the question of Nicholas’ personal attitudes about Jews, 
I would have very little to add to what Thomas Izbicki has 
discussed in his essay on “Nicholas of Cusa and the 
Jews,”1 in which he both surveys Nicholas’ remarks about 
Jews in his sermons and speculative works and reviews 
Nicholas’ legatine decrees of 1451 and 1452 concerning 
Jewish inhabitants in Salzburg, the Low Countries, and the 
                                                          
1 Thomas M. Izbicki, “Nicholas of Cusa and the Jews” in Conflict and 
Reconciliation: Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, ed. Inigo Bocken (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004), 119-130. 
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Rhineland—many of which were regarded by the Christian 
occupants of those lands as being so severe that they were 
eventually suspended by pope Nicholas V. But, beyond 
Izbicki’s contribution in this arena, I believe that, by 
focusing on why and how Nicholas’ anti-Judaism expresses 
itself in the De pace fidei, we will have an important access 
to the hermeneutic principles that undergird his 
speculative theology. Unfortunately, to proceed in this 
manner requires that that we attend to Nicholas’ anti-
Judaism, even while we endeavor not reduce the 
significance of his views to one of its most unpleasant 
manifestations.  
But before wading any further into my topic, I feel that I 
owe you an explanation for how a paper that focuses on 
Nicholas’ anti-Judaism might fit in a panel on “Nicholas of 
Cusa and Jewish Thought,” for, after all, in one sense I’m 
presenting not on Nicholas and Jewish thought but on 
Nicholas and anti-Jewish thought. Consequently, if there is 
anything like Jewish thoughtfulness in what I am about to 
say, it may be something that I will have to import into the 
discussion. Indeed, there may be some truth to this since my 
own orientation to the question of Nicholas’ anti-Judaism 
might rightly be described by others as the orientation of 
an outsider to Nicholas’ religious tradition, and even more 
specifically as that of either a Jewish or atheist outsider. 
Though, as I said, there may be only some truth to this, 
since I am no more an insider to either atheism or Judaism 
than I am an outsider to Christianity. At the Passover 
Seder, for instance, my wife’s family and our Jewish friends 
like to joke that, even if I am not Jewish, at least I am Jew-
ish. By a similar token, my relationship to atheism is an 
ambivalent one. As a matter of fact, it has often seemed to 
me that many of my friends who describe themselves as 
atheists (some of these professed atheists also identify 
themselves as Jews, by the way) find my views on the 
meaningfulness of religious discourse to be heretical with 
regard to the beliefs that they appear to maintain as a 
fundamental orthodoxy of atheism. In any case, from the 
standpoint of Nicholas’ Christianity, I am probably 
correctly called a pagan or infidel rather than heretic or 
apostate. Consequently, I offer an outsider’s perspective 
on the question of what Nicholas of Cusa’s anti-Judaism 
might reveal about the hermeneutic limitations of his 
theological convictions. My hope is that, in the course of 
this discussion, it will be evident that that my 
characterization of Nicholas’ views will prove to be more 
faithful to him than he was in his depictions of the 
representatives of various non-Christian religions in the De 
pace fidei.  
Before turning to the specific issue of the De pace fidei’s 
anti-Judaism, however, I think it will be useful for me to 
add an additional prefatory remark regarding the tacit 
philosophy of history that I believe we may discern in 
Nicholas’ speculative philosophy. In some of my other 
recent work, I’ve endeavored to show that, especially in his 
later speculative works (e.g., De visione Dei, De aequalitate, De 
principio, De ludo globi, and De venatione sapientiae), Nicholas 
rejects a univocal conception of the meaning of Creation 
in favor of one that accentuates the role of the 
individuated human soul as always seeking for itself and 
creating itself as an image of an absconded God. As a 
consequence of this conception, I have also argued that 
these works permit Nicholas’ readers the latitude to argue 
that Nicholas generally maintains the understanding that all 
historical events, insofar as they are the unfolding of an 
eternal beginning, are conceptually linked to the 
significance of Incarnation even while allowing that these 
conceptual links may be nothing other than historically 
contingent images or “signs” (or interpretations) of the 
Incarnation. In light of this, to the extent that one might 
speak of an arche or eschaton for Nicholas, one may speak 
only of an eternal referent for any temporal activity 
whatsoever. Or, as he puts it in the Trialogus de possest 
(1460), there is no contradiction between the claim that 
“eternity as a whole is at once present at every point of 
time” and the claim that “God as the Beginning and the 
End is at once and as a whole present in all things.”1 Thus, 
each and every historical unfolding derives its significance 
                                                          
1 “Non repugnare aeternitatem simul totam esse in quolibet puncto 
temporis et deum principium et finem simul esse totum in omnibus” (§ 
19). All Latin references are to Nicolai de Cusa Opera omnia iussu et 
auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Heigelbergensis as reproduced by the 
Cusanus Portal of the Institute for Cusanus Research at the University 
of Trier (http://www.cusanus-portal.de/). Unless otherwise noted, 
translations are those of Jasper Hopkins in Complete Philosophical and 
Theological Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: The Arthur J. 
Banning Press, 2001). 
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and self-justification solely in relation to the Incarnation, 
an “event” that is both unfolded in time and yet also 
enfolds the meanings of all other shared histories of 
temporal events. Nevertheless, because of the multiplicity 
of existent, individuated souls, the meaning of history is 
the product not of a stable referent but of an unstable 
one—or rather, to be more precise, the ultimate referent 
for the meaning of any contingent history remains an 
Incarnative Beginning that is beyond comprehension, but 
this Beginning, precisely because it is beyond 
comprehension, does not itself provide a univocal 
determination of the intelligibility of any particular range 
of history from which one might seek meaning. There are, 
in short, multiple histories, and each history provides a 
unique hermeneutic frame of reference for interpreting 
what is presupposed as the same underlying but otherwise 
inaccessible origin. 
Let me now return to the De pace fidei. If I am at all correct 
in these general claims about Nicholas’ philosophy of 
history, then it should not be surprising to find that the De 
pace fidei depicts an ecumenical dialogue that illustrates this 
same general understanding. And, indeed, the De pace fidei 
does explicitly defend the claim that “there is one religion 
and worship, which is presupposed in all the diversity of 
rites” (6.16).1 Therefore, Nicholas seems to say, so long as 
there are enlightened rulers who recognize, encourage, and 
participate in dialogue between wise representatives of the 
diverse religions, peace can be lasting. In a similar vein, it 
also makes a great deal of sense that Nicholas highlights 
the fact that, when—especially as a result of historical 
entrenchment—creeds and other aspects of religious rites 
are mistaken for the truth itself, an ossification of human 
possibility results. Moreover, as Nicholas explicitly notes in 
the De pace fidei, this process of ossification is a major cause 
of strife in the world, since “the earthly human condition 
has this characteristic: viz., that longstanding custom, 
which is regarded as having passed over into nature, is 
defended as the truth. In this way there arise great quarrels 
when each community prefers its own faith to another” (§ 
1.4).  
                                                          
1 “Una est igitur religio et cultus omnium intellectus vigentium, quae in 
omni diversitate rituum praesupponitur.” 
But although the basic argument of the De pace fidei seems 
to suggest that all temporal rites are equally accurate (or 
equally inaccurate) manifestations of the one true faith 
underlying them all, the dialogue also appears to argue that 
some specific rites such as the Sacraments of Baptism and 
Marriage are so intimately associated with the one true 
faith that they are not merely optional but are, rather, 
required for entrance into the one true faith. Still, even in 
these cases, I think it may be possible to argue that Paul’s 
role in the last third of the dialogue as adjudicator of the 
question of which particular rites must be enforced on 
behalf of the presupposed (but otherwise inaccessible) 
transcendent unity of faith tends to emphasize the practical 
(ethical) value of various rites rather than the question of 
their doctrinal veracity. For instance, while Paul allows a 
great deal of latitude concerning the extrinsic customs 
through which the Sacrament of Eucharist might be 
practiced (“provided faith is always maintained” § 18.66), 
he is less flexible about conventions regarding marriage 
since these conventions, he argues, concern moral 
behavior about which, unlike in matters of doctrine and 
speculation, it would not be prudent “to make allowances 
for the weakness of men” (§ 19.67). In other words, 
insofar as the De pace fidei offers a preference for the 
unique doctrinal content of Christianity, it does so on 
grounds that leave intact the presupposition that diverse 
religions each aim to perfect human beings with regard to 
the same underlying notion of the perfectibility of the 
species. Thus, even Paul’s role in the De pace fidei seems to 
offer a perspective on religious diversity that is generally 
consistent with the philosophy of history that I have been 
exploring in several of Nicholas’ other speculative works.   
Unfortunately, at the same time, the manuductive process 
by which the De pace fidei’s representatives of non-Christian 
communities (especially those representing Islam) are 
depicted as being led to agreement with the Word and its 
apostolic representatives provokes suspicion. And, most 
disturbing of all, Nicholas seems to deny the representative 
of Judaism the one thing that every other participant 
achieves, for when the Jewish interlocutor is depicted as 
reluctant to acknowledge and accept the mystery of 
Incarnation, the Persian points out that “it will be more 
difficult to bring the Jews than others to this belief for they 
 AMERICAN  CUSANUS  SOCIETY  NEWSLETTER 




admit nothing expressly about Christ.” To this remark, 
Peter simply responds: 
In their Scriptures they have all these [teachings] regarding 
Christ; but they follow the literal meaning and refuse to 
understand. However, this resistance of the Jews will not 
impede harmony, for [the Jews] are few in number and will 
not be able to trouble the whole world by force of arms. 
(12.41)1 
Beyond this, even more astonishing to me is that, not 
much later, in his discussion with the German, Peter 
ironically adduces from the Jewish practice of Kiddush 
HaShem (it seems likely that Nicholas is relying on the 
reports of Christian crusaders in the Rhineland) the 
conclusion that Jews at least implicitly believe in the 
possibility of individual immortality since “for the sake of 
keeping and sanctifying the law, the Jews often deliver 
themselves over unto death,” which, according to Peter, 
means that the Jewish choice to die as a Jew rather than be 
forcibly converted to Christianity is legitimate evidence 
that Jews unwittingly maintain “a faith which presupposes 
Christ” (§ 15.53). 
 
In essence, then, Nicholas does not reject Jewish ethical 
and liturgical practices on the grounds of their practical 
import (which is Paul’s strategy in the De pace fidei’s 
discussion of the quasi-universal value of some specific 
rites). Instead, Judaism is rejected because of a supposed 
stubborn refusal of Jews to practice hermeneutic charity in 
their interpretations of their own rites—i.e., Jewish 
stubbornness is characterized as a rational failure rather 
than a moral one. Needless to say, it is utterly vicious for 
Nicholas to assert that this correctly characterizes Jewish 
attitudes toward Christianity, let alone Jewish attitudes 
towards Jewish history and Judaism. So, in short, the De 
pace fidei’s anti-Judaism betrays both the philosophy of 
history that Nicholas explores in other speculative works 
as well as the possibility of reading the De pace fidei as 
                                                          
1 Persa: “…Erit tamen difficilius Iudaeos ad huius credulitatem 
conducere quam alios, quoniam ipsi de Christo nihil per expressum 
admittunt.” Petrus: “Habent in suis scripturis de Christo illa omnia; sed 
litteralem sensum sequentes intelligere nolunt. Haec tamen Iudaeorum 
resistentia non impediet concordiam. Pauci enum sunt et turbare 
universum mundum armis non poterunt.” 
grounding the question of the legitimacy of particular 
modes of religious rites not in terms of the veracity of their 
orthodoxical relationship to a transcendently unified faith 
but in terms of their orthopraxical significance in guiding 
human conduct.  
 
Moreover, the anti-Jewish sentiments of the De pace fidei 
also introduce a broader, perhaps more troubling question 
for Christian theology—one that can be made manifest by 
attending to the bitter ironies in Nicholas’ portrayal of 
Jewish stubbornness. The first of these ironies is a 
consequence of the fact that Nicholas’ Jewish interlocutor 
is, of course, a fiction. It is, after all, one thing for the 
biblical Moses to characterize Jews as stubborn, but at least 
Moses was, more or less, Jewish. But it is quite another 
thing, I think, for a 15th century cardinal of the Roman 
Catholic Church to depict, in the medium of an explicit 
fiction, Saint Peter as having asserted this in response to a 
question offered by an anonymous Persian interlocutor.  
 
Let’s pause on this thought for a moment. I’d like to read 
to you from Brian Klug’s public address marking the 75th 
anniversary of Kristellnacht at the Jewish History Museum 
in Berlin. For while racist anti-Semitism and Nicholas’ 
religious anti-Judaism are not entirely the same creature, 
the applicability of Klug’s discussion of the function of anti-
Semitism to our consideration of the De pace fidei will be 
readily apparent. In his address, Klug remarks:  
 
Antisemitism consists in collapsing [a] distinction, so that to 
be Jewish is to be ‘Jewish’. The image, so to speak, fastens 
on to the reality: it uses the reality to proclaim itself falsely as 
real. ‘The rats are underneath the piles. / The Jew is 
underneath the lot’, is how T S Eliot puts it in two odious 
lines of poetry. But ‘underneath the lot’ is not the real Jew, 
the flesh-and-blood Jew; it is Eliot’s Jew, the figure of the 
‘Jew’, a kind of cud, chewed over and spat out by the poet. 
For Eliot, this distinction between real Jews and his Jews is a 
distinction without a difference. And there’s the rub: 
thinking that Jews are really ‘Jews’ is precisely the core of 
antisemitism.2 
                                                          
2 “What Do We Mean When We Say ‘Antisemitism’?” Page 5 of the ms. 
for a keynote lecture of a conference on “Antisemitism in Europe 
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In short, Klug points out that anti-Semitism—and, he goes 
on to say, bigotry in general—intends to rob its victims of 
the autonomy to define and live the meanings of their own 
identities. However, I think we need to go a little further 
than Klug does in the specific context of the remark I have 
just quoted (though I would be surprised if Klug would 
disagree very much about the gist of what follows) by 
noting that Klug’s definition clearly implies that the bigot’s 
own self-definition is also partially constructed on the basis 
of its fictional representation of the identity of its intended 
victim. In other words, bigotry doesn’t merely rob the 
autonomy of those who are its intended victims; bigotry 
also functions to deny the autonomy of self-definition to 
those who embrace it. Thus, whether or not they are 
successful in their intended oppression of others, it is 
nevertheless always true that bigots are victims of their 
own views. 
 
It is (or, at any rate, it should be) troubling enough to 
Cusanus scholars to have to acknowledge that the Bishop 
of Brixen was at least a bit of a bigot. But, in truth, this 
observation is important today only insofar as it has the 
potential to open for us more interesting questions than 
those having to do merely with this detail of Nicholas’ 
biography. Thus, the reason I want to stress that the logic 
of bigotry undermines the autonomy not only of its 
intended victims but also of bigots themselves is that 
recognizing this phenomenon helps make clear why the 
anti-Jewish trope in the De pace fidei exposes even while it 
simultaneously betrays Nicholas’ apologetic strategy in this 
text. This tension exists within Nicholas’ apologetic 
framework because his apologetic strategy hinges in part 
on the argument that the superiority of Christianity is a 
function of the fact that its theology is uniquely capable of 
recognizing how it is that a diversity of religions might 
manifest the presupposed unity of the grace of divine self-
communication. That is, Nicholas seems to argue that 
                                                                                                     
Today: the Phenomena, the Conflicts,” organized by the Jewish 
Museum Berlin, the Foundation for Remembrance, Responsibility and 
Future, and the Centre for Research on Antisemitism, Berlin Institute of 
Technology, to mark the 75th anniversary of Kristallnacht. The text and 
a recorded video of the keynote can be found on the Jewish Museum 
Berlin’s website: http://www.jmberlin.de/main/EN/02-
Events/Events_2013/2013_11_08_klug.php (viewed August 16, 2014).   
Christianity’s legitimacy and superiority as a manifestation 
of the one, true faith is partly a function of its ability to 
encourage ecumenical relationships between human 
beings—to offer sacramental and liturgical practices whose 
explicit forms may vary considerably across time and place 
so long as, within those particular contexts, the practices 
are accommodated to the intellectual and ethical needs of 
their practitioners. Thus it is a bitter irony indeed that the 
“Jew” is offered as a representative of a religion that 
utterly fails to accommodate the ecumenical spirit of 
Christianity—and it is, of course, a bitter irony because, in 
constructing Jewish identity as a metaphor for religious 
intolerance, Nicholas undermines his own apologetic 
strategy—it is Nicholas who comes across as stubbornly 
clinging to a narrow interpretation of the ecumenical 
possibilities of Jewish practices, as is especially evident 
where the question of the correct methods of biblical 
allegoresis are concerned. (And, at this point, it should be 
safe for me to say that it is no mere personal prejudice on 
my part to point out the monstrous irony of Nicholas’ 
characterization as stubborn and narrow-minded a people 
who are fond of joking that where there are two Jews 
present, there are at least three opinions.) 
 
The problem may be that Christianity is just not very good 
at trying to defend itself on ecumenical grounds, and 
perhaps Nicholas’ failure is a consequence of trying to 
shoulder the burden of defining Christianity in part by 
thinking about what would constitute a rejection of its 
revealed content. That is, even though Nicholas clearly 
intends to defend Christianity’s legitimacy on the grounds 
that it correctly sees the temporal world as imbued and 
leavened by an unchanging, eternal, and divine power, he 
must also nevertheless both make allowances (in the case 
of human beings) for the freedom to reject the significance 
of this act of divine communication while simultaneously 
reading those rejections as confirming the significance of 
the very thing that is being rejected. In short, Nicholas is 
caught in the bind of allowing for the possibility of the 
anonymous Christian and implicit acts of faith but not 
being able to make space for genuine, willful indifference 
to the veracity of Christian orthodoxy. Put differently, the 
De pace fidei’s underlying incarnational metaphysics basically 
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requires that everyone who does not identify herself as a 
Christian is either an unwitting Christian or an 
unredeemably wicked person who stubbornly rejects the 
grace of divine self-communication. 
In Nicholas’ case, the nearest thing to an absolute rejection 
of Christianity is metaphorically identified with “Jewish” 
stubbornness. I do not need to say that this way of 
thinking about Jews and/or Judaism is not merely an 
aberration of Nicholas’ own personal bigotry since anti-
Judaism is hardly unique in the history of Christian 
theology. In fact, perhaps it is necessary for Christianity to 
understand itself as emerging out of a peculiar moment in 
a history that its flock tends to believe it shares with 
Judaism at least up until that time. The trouble is that 
Christianity, in Nicholas’ hands at any rate, also sees 
Judaism itself as basically nothing more than a part of the 
single unified hermeneutic framework of the revealed 
history of Christianity. But, for obvious reasons, this is not 
how Jews understand themselves in relationship to what 
Christians tend to insist or assume is a shared history—
which is to say nothing more than that there actually is 
more than one history here, and that, consequently, the 
particular rites that develop within the contexts of these 
different historical perspectives can only truly share, at 
best, an orthopraxical justification rather than any 
justification that that depends upon certitude regarding 
specific doctrinal content of the various possible meanings 
of revelation. 
 
Leaving Nicholas’ own specific case aside for a moment, 
my fundamental worry at this juncture1 is whether 
Christianity is ultimately capable of such an understanding 
of itself. To put this question in its most abstract form, I 
wonder to what extent Christianity’s emphasis on defining 
itself in terms of the veracity of its creeds (orthodoxy) 
hinders its ability to seek justification for itself as an 
orthopraxis. Christianity—by which I suppose I mean 
those who choose to identify themselves as Christians—
                                                          
1 I should note that my own thoughts about this “worry” have been in 
flux for the greater part of my life, and even I suspect that this will be a 
“worry” that stays with me, I don’t by any means suppose that I will 
continue to worry about it in the same way or for the same reasons I do 
at this particular juncture in my life. 
have a choice to make. On the one hand, Christianity may 
continue to define itself as a set of practices rooted in utter 
conviction about the veracity of its own unique 
interpretation of the revelation of an unchanging univocal 
reality, even while acknowledging that this univocal reality 
is only truly knowable by a single divine author. 
Unfortunately, this Christianity will tend to regard those 
who choose not to be Christians either as unwitting 
Christians or as fundamentally defective human beings 
who are incapable of charity and toleration. For non-
Christians, of course, this strategy will seem not only 
hypocritical and incoherent but also prone to devolving 
into a rigid dogmatic scheme that, in practice, defines itself 
by constructing and imposing on those whom it regards as 
infidels and heretics a meaning that differs from how those 
others understand themselves.  
A second option would be for Christianity to come to 
understand its own legitimacy on orthopraxical grounds 
rather than in terms of the supposed veracity of its 
revealed doctrinal content. This would probably be all well 
and good for many non-Christians, but for many 
Christians the pluralistic tendencies of this approach may 
seem too wishy-washy on the question of Christianity’s 
underlying metaphysical commitments. The concern, in 
short, is that this second approach is liable to treat the 
person of Jesus mythologically and, in so doing, risk either 
denying the doctrine of the hypostatic union or leaving no 
ground on which to identify an actual point or points in 
history in which divine self-communication is uniquely 
manifested as a (sacred) ground for the development of a 
spiritual dimension in human life.  
 
It’s not for me to say in which direction Christian theology 
ought to head. Yet, even if I must insist that I understand 
myself to be a no more than a fellow-traveler with many 
Christians in this world, I don’t think it is in any way 
illegitimate for me to communicate what I find 
problematic about Christian theology. Besides, in other 
contexts, I’d also be happy to tell you what I find 
appealing about Christianity. But I remain, nevertheless, an 
infidel, and it is not my intention to offer an apology for a 
worldview that I do not consciously profess. I do, of 
course, invite those for whom that sort of apology is 
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warranted to evaluate my diagnosis of this problem and 
offer a solution to it if they think the diagnosis is correct. 
At any rate, this broader concern is well beyond the 
specific scope of my interest in exploring the tension that I 
see within the hermeneutic principles that are at work in 
Nicholas’ philosophy of history, his theology, and his 
philosophical anthropology. I’d like to conclude, then, by 
returning to my terra familiaris and offer a comment on the 
tension between the De pace fidei’s ecumenical aims and its 
apologetic strategy. Because the text’s treatment of the 
representatives of Islam and Judaism makes this tension so 
obvious, it has often seemed strange to me that Cusanus 
scholars frequently look to the De pace fidei for evidence of 
the practical ecumenical import of Nicholas’ speculative 
philosophy when other speculative works seem much 
more capable of shouldering that burden. But, to be fair, 
perhaps the abstractness of the speculative scope of the 
other works does not actually lend itself to thinking 
through the most significant practical implications of the 
fact that the human being is the sort of being whose 
felicity would require an insight into its very constitution as 
a being who must create meaning for itself. That is, it is 
one thing to explain in an abstract manner why a rational 
soul must strive to understand itself as a microcosm of the 
world and to offer that explanation through the idiom of a 
theology that articulates this view as a consequence of the 
human being’s unique situation in its relationship to its 
divine author. It is likely to be quite another thing, 
however, to try to grapple with the way in which concrete 
political practices (religious practices being a species of 
political practices in this regard) foster or hinder human 
strivings. Perhaps, then, it is fair to say that the De pace 
fidei’s value for us consists both in its explanation of the 
political perils of doctrinal entrenchment and, at the same 
time, in its exhibition of the very failure that Nicholas 
works so hard to caution us against. But in order to 
appreciate its value in this regard—in order to keep faith 
with the insights that the text offers—we need to be 
prepared to see both aspects of this particular text even 
while we endeavor to guard against—and acknowledge the 
likelihood that we will fail to guard against—these same 
failures in responding to our own temptations either to 
valorize or condemn the text to the extent that it agrees or 
disagrees with the assumptions that frame our own 
interpretative activities. And if my call for this kind of 
interpretive disposition sounds to some others as if I am 
calling for something like Christian charity and humility, 
well, then, at least I’ve had the opportunity to make my 




Paper Presentation: “Mirror, Seed, and Tree: 
Bridging Transcendence and Immanence in 
Cusanus and Spinoza” by Martin Sastri, University of Notre Dame, Indiana 
 
It would be a naïve distortion to give a broad, universal 
characterization to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
However, it can be said that Deleuze’s attention to the 
history of philosophy is directed in part by a desire to 
establish immanence as a positive principle. And so 
Deleuze will refer to moments in philosophy—such as 
Duns Scotus’ univocity of being—as making up a “secret 
history,” in which immanence is covertly established as a 
positive principle, overlaid by a superstructure of 
transcendence and remote divinity.  
 
In his monograph Spinoza et le Problème de l’Expression,1 
Deleuze finds in Spinoza the perfect mechanism for the 
emergence and maintenance of immanence from cause to 
effect. Spinoza’s God is a unique, infinite substance 
expressing an infinity of attributes. What is crucial here is 
the activity, expression. It is not so important—at least to 
Deleuze—what God is in himself; absolute infinity is an 
important precondition for what God does, but ultimately 
it is the expression of this infinity into attributes, 
explicating the divine essence, that makes this such an 
important part of the history of immanence. The 
continuity of Spinozan substance, attributes, and modes is 
unbroken and can be traversed by the mind as seamlessly 
                                                          
1 (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1968). There is an English translation 
available, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New 
York: Zone Books, 1990).  All references will be to the French edition. 
